ChrisBALL

Game Theory

Assoc. Prof. Chris Ball

Economics Department

Email: christopher.ball@qu.edu

Office phone: +1 203 582 8745

Office Location: 4th Floor Rocky Top Student Center

QU Course Number: EC 355

Days: T,TH

Time:  3:30 pm - 4:45 pm

Location:  TH 328

Download the Syllabus

Outline, Notes and Reading

Most of these are still based on the Watson textbook which I always used (see Book Recommendations)

• Introduction

  • Watson Chap 1 "Introduction"

  • Watson Chap 5 "General Assumptions and Methodology"

  • Ball Chap 0 "Introduction"

• Sequential Move Games Part I

  • Reading Ball Chap 1 "Modeling Basics"

  • Reading Watson

    • Chap 2 "The Extensive Form"​

    • Chap 3 "Strategies and the Normal Form". Focus on the first part "Terminology and Notation for Strategies" and skip the Normal Form for now.​

  • ​Reading Ball

    • Handwritten Notes "Actions vs Strategies, Centipede Games, etc."

    • Handwritten Notes "Credibility and Entry Games"

  • Basic Games with numbers to look at: Eviction, Big John-Little John​, Google vs Microsoft, Dr. Strangelove

  • Practice with Extensive Games: download here and download the KEY here.

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 1

• Handling Variables and a Slightly Different Take on How to Use Games

  • Games with variables to look at: Kidnapping and Nuisance suits

  • Reading Bargaining Problems​ and Markets

    • 02.01 Bargaining Games Pt 1

    • 02.02 Bargaining Games Pt 2

    • 02.03 Bargaining Pt 3 Rubenstein

    • Watson, Chap 19 (an interested student should do the class lectures first, then read Chap 18, 19 and 20)

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 2

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• Sequential Move Games Part II

  • 02.04 Lemons Market 1

  • 03.01 Preferences of Individuals

  • 03.02 Preferences and Collective Choice

  • 03.03 Preferences and Utility

  • 03.04 Utility and Uncertainty

  • 03.05 Strategic Voting

  • 03.06 Adding Random Actions Pt 1

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 3

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MIDTERM Exam, Tuesday, October 26

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• Sequential Move Pt III: Principal Agent and Randomness

  • 04.01 Principal Agent Models 1 Linear Util and Certainty

  • 04.02 Principal Agent Models 2 Linear Util and Uncertainty

  • Extensions of the Principal Agent Model (not covered in class, Fall 2021, but totally doable)

    • 04.03 Principal Agent Models 3 NonLinear Util and Uncertainty

    • 04.05 Principal Agent Models 4 Extensions and Applications

    • 04.06 Princ Agents and Cheap Talk

    • 04.07 Princ Agents and Ultimatum

  • Practice Problems:  

    • ​Problem Set 4 - Principal Agent Games

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• Sequential Move Games Part III: Randomness 2

  • Types and Adding Randomness early in the game​

  • How Lemons Destroy Markets and What Can Be Done

  • Bayesian Asymmetric Information Games

    • 05.01 Signaling Models 1 Gifts and Beliefs

    • 05.02 Signaling Models 2 Basic Lemons (again)

    • 05.03 Signaling Models 3 Education

    • Education Signaling Game (download)​​

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 5 - Information Games

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• Simultaneous Move Games Part I

  • Strategic Form Games and Pure Nash Equilibria

    • 06.01 Simultaneous Moves Part 1

    • 06.02 Simultaneous Moves Part 2

    • 06.03 Simultaneous Moves Part 3 Some Classic Games

  • Sequential and Simultaneous Games: SPE again

    • 06.04 Simultaneous Games: SPE and Nash

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 6 - Simultaneous Games to Practice

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• Simultaneous Move Games Part II​

  • ​Mixed Nash

    • 06.05 Simultaneous Games and Mixed Nash

    • 06.06 Calculating Mixed Nash and Looking at Dominated Strategies

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 7 - Mixed Nash

  • Dominance Solvable Games: Location Games

    • 06.07 Dominated Solvability and Rationalizable

    • 06.08 Three Player Games

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 8 - Location Games

  • Contracting and Law in Games

    • Notes are Watson Chap 13

  • Practice Problems:  

    • Problem Set 9 - Contracting

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Final Paper Due

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Final Exam

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BOOKS for the Course

1. Joel Watson, " Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory (Third Edition)" I found this to be the best undergrad text to use and used it for years.  I highly recommend it.

2. Chris Ball (draft) "Modelling With Games: An Introduction to Modelling Human Behavior Using Game Theory"

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READINGS

• Dixit Nalebuff, 1991, (p. 14 - 17) "Here I Stand" (commitment devices)

• Dixit Nalebuff, 1992, Chap 6 (p. 142 - 167) "Credible Commitments"

• Bueno de Mesquita, Chap 2 "​Collective Goals:" Scanned Chap 2 from Ethan Bueno de Mesquita's Political Economy for Public Policy (amazon link to book)​

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GAMES

SEQUENTIAL MOVE GAMES

• ​Eviction Game (strategies vs actions and backward induction)

  • Dixit Nalebuff version

  • Gintis version

• "Big John Little John" game done in class (first, second mover)

• Google vs Microsoft, Gintis version

• Dr. Strangelove, Gintis version

• Kidnapping, Gintis version

• Nuisance Suits

  • Gintis version​

  • Rasmusses version plus other versions and discussion

• Strategic Voting, Ghintis version​

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SIMULATENEOUS MOVE

• 2019 Inspection Game

• 2019 Lobbying Game

• 2019 Watson Location Game (uses elimination of dominated strategies)

• Civic Duty N-Person Game

• 2019 Welfare Game w Calc at End (Rasmussen)

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SEQUENTIAL and/or SIMULTANEOUS ("complete games")

• Welfare Game no Calc (extensive then Rasmussen version)

• Bank Runs Sequential and Simultaneous

• 2020 Dynamic Monopoly Game

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ALL My Hand-Written Class Notes in One Place​

• 01.01 Actions vs Strategies_ Centipede Games

• 01.02 Credibility and Entry Games

• 02.01 Bargaining Games Pt 1

• 02.02 Bargaining Games Pt 2

• 02.03 Bargaining Pt 3 Rubenstein

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• 02.04 Lemons Market 1

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• 03.01 Preferences of Individuals

• 03.02 Preferences and Collective Choice

• 03.03 Preferences and Utility

• 03.04 Utility and Uncertainty

• 03.05 Strategic Voting

• 03.06 Adding Random Actions Pt 1

• 04.01 Principal Agent Models 1 Linear Util and Certainty

• 04.02 Principal Agent Models 2 Linear Util and Uncertainty

• 04.03 Principal Agent Models 3 NonLinear Util and Uncertainty

• 04.05 Principal Agent Models 4 Extensions and Applications

• 04.06 Princ Agents and Cheap Talk

• 04.07 Princ Agents and Ultimatum​

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• 05.01 Signaling Models 1 Gifts and Beliefs

• 05.02 Signaling Models 2 Basic Lemons (again)

• 05.03 Signaling Models 3 Education

  • 05.50 Lemons Market 2

  • 05.51 Lemons Market 3

  • 05.52 Lemons Market 4

  • 05.53 Lemons Market 5 Final Version

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• 06.01 Simultaneous Moves Part 1

• 06.02 Simultaneous Moves Part 2

• 06.03 Simultaneous Moves Part 3 Some Classic Games

• 06.04 Simultaneous Games: SPE and Nash

• 06.05 Simultaneous Games and Mixed Nash

• 06.06 Calculating Mixed Nash and Looking at Dominated Strategies

• 06.07 Dominated Solvability and Rationalizable

• 06.08 Three Player Games

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PRACTICE PROBLEMS

• Problem Set 1

• Problem Set 2

• Problem Set 3

• Problem Set 4 - Principal Agent Games

• Problem Set 5 - Information Games

• Problem Set 6 - Simultaneous Games to Practice

• Problem Set 7 - Mixed Nash

• Problem Set 8 - Location Games

• Problem Set 9 - Contracting

• OLD Lemon Market Practice Problems (not assigned Fall 2021)

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EXCEL SHEETS to MAKE GAMES

Use these sheets however you like. Check them all.  Take and use anything you like, modify it for your paper.

• Games Basic Extensive

• Games Basic Ultimatum

• Games Bayesian Asymmetric Info

• Games in n dimensions

• Games Normal Form

• Games Principal Agent

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL​

• Mixed Strategies - YouTube Video that's presented similar to the way we do in class. Note: I let p = prob(P2 chooses s1) and q = prob(P1 chooses s1). They switch them in this video. Otherwise, very similar to how I present it.

• Another version of Harsanyi's Centipede game - YouTube Video, useful for understanding strategies and backward induction, extensive form games.

• Bridge Burning and Commitment - YouTube Video, useful for extensive forms, SPE, and also understanding the key nature of strategies and commitment

• Joel Watson's lectures for undergrads. The great thing is that all his notation will be the same as what we use since we follow his textbook closely.​

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